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Mr Trukhtanov1 has made his own summary of and response to my own account2 of equitable (and statutory) 
assignment, and how notice of assignment operates within them. Having been reminded of how the cases on the 
topic are usually understood, readers will have to make up their own minds. While there is, always, room for 
further thought, it is important not to lose sight of two fairly important distinctions. Where A is the debtor,3 B is 
the creditor, and C is an assignee to whom B has assigned the chose in action arising from A’s debt obligation, a 
distinction should be drawn between: the question to whom the debtor is liable; and what the debtor is obliged to 
do to be discharged from that debt obligation.4 A distinction should also be drawn between cases where A has 
paid B in satisfaction of the contractual promise (thus discharging the contractual obligation by precise 
performance) and cases where A has not.5 
Mr Trukhtanov observes6 that in William Brandt’s Sons & Co v. Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd,7 Kramrisch had 
previously given Dunlop a general direction to make payments to Kleinwort. Relying on the authority of Page v. 
Meek,8 Mr Trukhtanov concludes that payment by Dunlop to Kleinwort pursuant to such general direction from 
Kramrisch must have resulted in a discharge of Dunlop’s debt obligation to Kramrisch. 
While not denying that an earlier general direction had been made, there is no rule of law that such directions are 
irrevocable. If one asks the question “how is it that a payment to a third party at the direction of the creditor 
results in a discharge of the obligation?”, Cockburn CJ would have answered that such discharge could have 
arisen as a matter of an accord and satisfaction or, as was actually held to be the case in Page v. Meek, where the 
parties had agreed to vary the manner of payment to some other form, compliance with that varied manner of 
payment would entitle the debtor to make a special plea of payment.9 In either case, the discharge arises because 
of mutual agreement. And, if that is the case, obviously, the parties are free to enter into further modifications of 
their mutual obligations. 
On the facts of Brandt’s, there is nothing to indicate that parties might have intended the directions in that case to 
have been irrevocable: indeed, the tenor of the speeches in Brandt’s indicates otherwise. Had the special direction 
by Kramrisch to Paterson (the employee of Dunlop in Birmingham authorised to handle such correspondence) 
been forwarded to Dunlop’s head office in London (as ought to have been done), and had the head office acted 
upon such direction and effected payment to Brandt’s notwithstanding the earlier general direction to pay 
                                                          
1 A Trukhtanov, “In defence of the ‘no discharge after notice’ rule” [2010] LMCLQ 551 (hereafter “Trukhtanov”). 
2 C H Tham, “Notice of assignment and discharge by performance” [2010] LMCLQ 38 (hereafter “Tham”). 
3 For convenience, in line with the usage in my earlier paper, the debtor will be referred to as being feminine, whereas the 
creditor-assignor and the assignee are referred to as being masculine. 
4 Tham, 41. 
5 Tham, 59 and 72. 
6 Under the heading, “Authority for the rule” 
7 [1905] AC 454. 
8 (1862) 3 B & S 259; 122 ER 98. 
9 (1862) 3 B & S 259, 262–263; 122 ER 98, 99–100. 
  
Kleinwort, there is little in their Lordships’ speeches that suggests that they would have held such payment to be 
ineffective to discharge Dunlop from their obligations in relation to the shipment in question. Consequently, their 
Lordships must have taken the view that the general direction was revocable or, at least, capable of being 
suspended, and had been revoked/suspended in relation to the shipment specified in the special direction. 
As Lord Macnaghten put it: “[Paterson] did not think it worth while to send to the head office Brandt’s letter of 
January 7, 1903 and its inclosures [ie, the special direction]. The head office, therefore, knew nothing of this 
equitable assignment, and they paid the money to the wrong man because Kramrisch on a former occasion had 
given them a general direction to pay Kleinwort & Co. The difficulty … was ‘owing to the neglect of duty at 
Birmingham’. It would be unreasonable to make Brandt’s suffer for that”.10 It seems reasonably clear that their 
Lordships were of the view that the earlier general direction to pay Kramrisch was not applicable in relation to the 
payments due for the packages specified in the subsequent special direction to pay Brandt’s. That special direction 
had been communicated to the authorised representative of Dunlop; but for an internal misunderstanding arising 
from the failure to transmit that information to Dunlop’s head office, Dunlop would have acted upon it, and there 
is no reason why compliance with that special direction would have been ineffective as a form of discharge. In 
paying the wrong entity in relation to the particular shipment as a result of its internal mismanagement, Dunlop 
could not successfully claim to have discharged its obligation to make payment for the shipment. 
Mr Trukhtanov and I will have to agree to disagree over our very different readings of Brice v. Bannister.11 But 
Mr Trukhtanov’s reading of Jones v. Farrell12 may require a little clarification. For argument’s sake, Mr 
Trukhtanov seems willing to accept my view that, in light of the indorsement by the debtor (Moore) upon the 
written notice of assignment originating from his creditor (Farrell) that he would pay the assignee (Jones), Farrell 
had reached an accord and satisfaction with Moore as to the debt obligation between them, replacing it with an 
obligation whereby Moore was to pay Jones instead.13 Mr Trukhtanov also appears to be prepared to accept that 
the subject matter of the assignment to Jones would then be the chose in action arising out of the accord, and not 
the original debt obligation. However, he goes on to say that, “even on this rather generous view of the notice, 
Jones would have had to be non-suited in equity. Equity leaves an equitable assignee to pursue his action at law in 
the name of the assignor and does not give relief unless the assignor obstructs recovery at law”.14 Support for this 
is found in Hammond v. Messenger;15 and the conclusion is that “Jones’ proper recourse would have been to sue 
Moore at law in the name of Farrell; and, since Farrell’s own action at law on the new promise could only result 
in payment to Jones, there was no occasion for equity to assist”.16 
Hammond v. Messenger was a decision of the Vice-Chancellor upholding a general demurrer.17 In the course of 
dismissing the plaintiff’s inadequately pleaded bill, the Vice-Chancellor observed as follows: “if the creditor will 
not allow the matter to be tried at law in his name, this Court has a jurisdiction, in the first instance, to compel the 
debtor to pay the debt to the Plaintiff; especially in a case where the act done by the creditor is done in collusion 
with the debtor”.18 
It is unclear whether this supports the contention that Jones would have been non-suited in Equity in light of the 
two concessions noted above. First, Mr Trukhtanov’s reading of the rule in Hammond v. Messenger may go too 
                                                          
10 [1905] AC 454, 463. See also Lord James’ speech, at 464–465. 
11 Trukhtanov, text following n 21; Tham, 59–60. 
12 (1857) 1 De G & J 208; 44 ER 703. 
13 Trukhtanov, text following n 28. 
14 Trukhtanov, text following n 31. 
15 (1838) 9 Sim 327; 59 ER 383. 
16 Trukhtanov, text following n 31. 
17 See Sir Jack Jacob and IS Goldrein, Pleadings: Principles and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1990), 65 n 60. 
18 (1838) 9 Sim 327, 332–333; 59 ER 383, 385–386 (emphasis added). 
  
far. The Vice-Chancellor merely set out one example where Equity would not step in. Second, even taking that 
rule to be exhaustive, accepting that the debt obligation to pay Farrell had been replaced by an obligation to pay 
Jones, the most appropriate remedy for such a breach would have been the equitable remedy of specific 
performance19 and not the common law remedies of an action for a fixed sum20 or damages.21 Farrell’s own action 
before the common law courts on Moore’s obligations under the accord (and any action at law brought by Jones 
in Farrell’s name on the same) would likely have resulted in the award of inadequate remedies. Accordingly, 
Jones v. Farrell presents a perfectly reasonable set of facts upon which equity’s auxiliary jurisdiction might 
justifiably be resorted to.22 
Mr Trukhtanov supports23 a more traditional view as to how equity, common law and notice play their parts in the 
assignment of a debt.24 Apart from what follows, most of these views have already been discussed at some length 
in my paper.25 Mr Trukhtanov observes that “notice … was perfectly well explained at common law as the 
debtor’s authority to pay the assignee by way of proper discharge. When things went their normal course, and the 
debtor paid the assignee as assignor’s attorney under that authority, no further common law explanations were 
needed. If difficulties arose and either the assignor or the debtor became obstructive, the convolutions of variation 
by accord and satisfaction could not assist because they only created a contract for the benefit of a third party 
which was useless to the assignee”.26 
Mr Trukhtanov is content to rely on case authority which states that, when a debtor pays a third party at the 
direction of her creditor, the debtor is discharged from her debt obligation. But what doctrine underlies such 
discharge? The cases cited do not say, though I have suggested some possibilities, one of which involves reliance 
on discharge of the contractual obligation by way of an accord and satisfaction—that is, a variation of the original 
contract.27 That may be what prompts Mr Trukhtanov’s reference to the futility of the accord and satisfaction 
analysis. But that mistakes the context in which the accord and satisfaction reasoning was proposed. As I sought 
to explain, where the contract is incapable of being construed as permitting unilateral variation of the content of 
the debtor’s contractual obligation by the creditor, should the debtor pay the assignee as directed by the creditor, 
the common law may protect the debtor from being sued by the creditor (for not having discharged the obligations 
under the debt contract through precise performance) by concluding that there had, in effect, been a mutually 
agreed variation of that prior obligation, which variation had then been fully performed.28 If so, although the 
assignee would be a third-party beneficiary to the contract arising out of the accord and would, as a matter of 
privity, be powerless to bring proceedings at common law against the debtor upon it, that is irrelevant. Where the 
obligation in the accord to pay to the assignee has been performed, the assignee has no call to bring any 
proceedings against the erstwhile debtor.29 
                                                          
19 Cf Beswick v. Beswick [1968] AC 58. 
20 There being no common law debt between Moore and Farrell. 
21 Which would most likely have resulted only in an award of nominal damages since Moore had bound himself to Farrell 
under the accord to pay Jones. Whether the court would have been open to considering the plausibility of Farrell’s having 
sustained substantial loss in light of his performance interest is a moot question. 
22 This is not to say that there are no conceptual difficulties: infra, n 29. 
23 Under the heading “Equity does follow the law”. 
24 Trukhtanov, text between nn 38 and 47. 
25 Tham, 55–59. 
26 Trukhtanov, text from nn 44–46. 
27 Tham, 55–59. 
28 Tham, 57–59. Equity may also provide some protection through estoppel. 
29 Indeed, were the erstwhile debtor in breach of the accord, as has been pointed out above in relation to Jones v. Farrell, the 
equitable assignment may only have been of the chose in action arising out of the obligations set out in the accord. As 
suggested above, there seems no obvious reason why an equitable assignee in such a case ought to be precluded from seeking 
a remedy in equity to compel the obligor from performing the outstanding obligations set out in the accord, if any. 
  
Mr Trukhtanov also appears to accept that, notwithstanding receipt of notice of an assignment of the debt to the 
assignee, precise performance by a debtor in paying the creditor “thereby destroyed the cause of action at law that 
was the medium through which the assignee was to realise his beneficial interest. [But e]quity compensated the 
assignee by ordering the debtor to pay again. In so doing, it imposed a liability on the debtor, who knowingly 
involved himself in defeating the beneficial interest of the assignee”.30 Row v. Dawson31 is then cited in support 
of this proposition. 
Acceptance that precise performance by the debtor discharges the contractual obligation requires acceptance, too, 
that the subject matter of any assignment of the debt must be the chose in action arising from the contract agreed 
upon between the debtor, A, and the creditor, B:32 the chose in action is not the medium by which an assignee is 
to realise his beneficial interest, but its very subject matter. But, on either view, the effect of payment to the 
creditor is to destroy the assignee’s interest. So is Mr Trukhtanov right to say that equity then provides a remedy 
for such destruction? 
Mr Trukhtanov refers to Row v. Dawson, which addressed the question whether an equitable assignment33 had 
been effected of a fund in the hands of an officer of the Exchequer (S) standing to the credit of the assignor (G) in 
favour of two assignees (T and C), prior to the assignor’s bankruptcy, so as to ring-fence that fund (or at least so 
much of it as would satisfy the claims of the two assignees) from the bankrupt assignor’s ordinary creditors. The 
Lord Chancellor held that that was certainly the case. On the facts of Row v. Dawson, there was no question as to 
what might be the case had S actually paid G, despite having received notice of the assignments to T and C. 
Consequently, the Lord Chancellor’s observation that, “[S] could not have paid this money to [G], supposing he 
had not been bankrupt, without making himself liable to the defendants [T and C]; because he would have paid it 
with full notice of this assignment, for valuable consideration”34 is an obiter dictum. 
Given the nature of the dispute, the equitable interests of T and C arising out of the equitable assignments to them 
by G would have taken precedence over the interests of his debtors in bankruptcy, regardless of notice. Row v. 
Dawson is a case involving a dispute between an assignee and the assignor’s trustee-in-bankruptcy. Given that the 
trustee-in-bankruptcy takes no better interest in the bankrupt’s assets than the bankrupt himself, the Lord 
Chancellor would still have been bound to uphold the claims of the equitable assignees even if no notice had been 
given at all. On these facts, the reference by the Lord Chancellor to notice adds nothing to the reasoning 
underlying the court’s actual decision. 
Drawing upon the observations made by the Vice-Chancellor in Hammond v. Messenger, however, had S 
colluded with G to deprive the assignees of their interest, matters might have been different: knowing assistance 
liability might then have arisen, although mere notice ought not be sufficient.35 My analysis would suggest that, if 
anything, where the debtor is merely notified of the assignment but chooses to precisely perform her part of the 
contractual bargain despite that notice, the equities are tipped in favour of the debtor.36 
Mr Trukhtanov also dismisses possible difficulties with the doctrine of tender by applying the “conditional 
benefit” principle. That view, however, is not inconsistent with my analysis. If at all, the conditional benefit 
                                                          
Admittedly, there is a conceptual problem with this approach—but that is shared with any application of the Vandepitte 
procedure proper. For a discussion of the conceptual problem with the Vandepitte procedure and some suggested solutions, 
see M Smith, The Law of Assignment (OUP, Oxford, 2007), §§ 6.14–6.32. 
30 Trukhtanov, text to n 49. 
31 (1749) 1 Ves Sen 331; 27 ER 1064. 
32 Tham, 45–51. 
33 The assignment in Row v. Dawson must have been equitable, since that case was decided in 1749. 
34 (1749) 4 Ves Sen 331, 333; 27 ER 1064, 1065. 
35 Tham, 52. 
36 Tham, 52–55. 
  
principle is inconsistent with the proposition that notice of an assignment precludes a debtor from making or 
tendering payment to the assignor. As Megarry V-C made clear, where that principle applies, the conditional 
benefit principle is additive.37 Application of the conditional benefit principle merely ensures that the assignee, 
too, must accept a conforming tender. That principle accepts, however, that such obligations are not transferred 
from the assignor. 
Finally, with a view to demonstrating how inequitable the “no discharge after notice” rule may be, I posed an 
example in my paper involving an assignee who was out of the jurisdiction. The purpose of the example was to 
show how the identity of the creditor is just as much a term of the contract as any other. The importance of such 
terms as to the creditor’s entire identity was then underscored by the rule that, in the usual case, it is for the debtor 
to seek out her creditor so as to tender payment when the debt becomes due and payable. Mr Trukhtanov points 
out38 that, as a matter of common law, Fessard v. Mugnier39 holds that this rule is suspended when the creditor 
goes overseas after having entered into a contract with the debtor. The difficulties with the rule that a debtor must 
find her creditor are therefore mitigated. Or so it seems. 
First, the exception applies only to cases where the contract in question had been entered into in England. As on 
the facts of Fessard v. Mugnier itself, where the parties had entered into the contract while they were beyond 
English shores, the debtor would still be bound to seek the creditor to tender payment wherever the creditor might 
be. But, even where the contract had been entered into in England, the debtor must still track the movements of 
her creditor to determine whether her creditor remained in England, had moved overseas, or had returned to 
England. That practical problem of locating the creditor remains, whether to effect payment, or to take advantage 
of the exception in Fessard v. Mugnier. That problem would then be magnified if it is right that, following notice 
of an assignment, it is not possible for such debtor to rely on precise performance by payment to the creditor (as 
contractually stipulated) to discharge her from further liability on the chose in action arising from her contractual 
obligations. If that is correct, the debtor would then have to track the movements and location of a stranger to that 
contract. 
It is generally agreed that the modern law of assignment has moved towards the greater transferability of debts. 
My paper was an attempt to clarify the subject matter of the transfer effected by equitable and statutory 
assignment, and to explain how such transfer is effected without contravening fundamental principles of common 
law and equity. Even if this may be considered an “outdated” point of view, it can hardly be defunct. 
                                                          
37 Tito v. Waddell [1977] Ch 106, 290. Lord Woolf of Barnes (with whom Lords Keith of Kinkel, Slynn of Hadley and 
Lowry concurred) cited this passage with approval in Pan Ocean Shipping Ltd v. Creditocorp Ltd (The Trident Beauty) 
[1994] 1 WLR 161, 171. 
38 Under the heading, “Debt is nothing personal”. 
39 (1865) 18 CB (NS) 286; 141 ER 453. 
